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Hackers arrested after stealing more than 30 Jeeps in Texas Autoblog / August 4, 2016 It seems the news regarding vehicle hacking continues to get worse, especially when it comes to products from Fiat Chrysler Automobiles. Last year, a Jeep Cherokee in St. Louis, Missouri, was wirelessly hacked from Pittsburgh. Nissan had to shut down its Leaf app because of vulnerabilities. Now, a pair of hackers in Houston, Texas, stole more than 30 Jeeps over a six-month period. The two were arrested by police last Friday while attempting to steal another vehicle. ABC 13 in Houston reports that police had been following Michael Arcee and Jesse Zelay for several months but were unable to catch them in the act until now. The two were using a laptop to connect to and start a vehicle. It's unclear if the connection was through OBD II or USB or if the software they used has anything to do with the UConnect infotainment exploit from last year. In April, this surveillance video showed the theft of a Jeep Wrangler Unlimited. It was this footage that first led the police to Arcee and Zelay. The police began to follow and record the pair. That investigation eventually led to Friday's arrest. Both are charged with unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. In addition, Arcee is charged with felon in possession of a weapon and possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance. According to ABC 13, Homeland Security is investigating more than 100 stolen FCA vehicles that they believe were hacked using similar software. After their theft, the vehicles were brought across the border to Mexico. FCA is currently conducting an internal investigation into the matter. .

Taxpayer footed US weapons found abandoned in Aleppo, Syria RT / August 4, 2016 A vast quantity of western (mostly US) -made weapons and ammunition have been discovered in the Bani Zaid district of Aleppo. The area was recently abandoned by fighters from the Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra). It is considered a terrorist group by the UN and is not part of the cessation of hostilities in Syria. The group recently rebranded itself while breaking its ties with the global terror network Al-Qaeda. The majority of the weapons appear to be of US origin and include US-made anti-tank missiles system (TOW 2A), American UN0181 missiles, as well as US-made 81mm mortars and ammunition. Some of the boxes containing weapons are labeled with the letters ‘USA’. Among other weapons that can be seen in the video are a 57mm infantry mortar of a type produced in Germany, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) made by the Czech Republic. Security analyst and former UK counter terrorism intelligence officer Charles Shoebridge said the video appears to be “genuine”. “The United States has openly announced in the last year or so, that it is supplying anti-tank missiles, and anti-tank missiles of a type I should say that do appear to be in this video, the TOW as they are known,” to ‘moderate opposition’ in Syria, he said. Shoebdrige added that “as predicted from the start” such weapons end up “in the hands of extreme rebel groups”. In October last year a Pentagon-trained group of Syrian rebels known as Division 30, handed over their US delivered weapons to al-Sham terrorists. Shoebdrige said Washington does not resort to any “proper scrutiny” while delivering weapons to the ‘moderate’ rebel factions in Syria. That’s despite “almost certainly knowing that they will end up in the hands of the groups such as al-Nusra.” Shoebdrige doesn’t expect any change in America’s stance, noting that such groups are one of the most “effective fighters” against the Syrian government. In November 2015, the Free Syrian Army’s 1st Coastal Brigade, a US-backed rebel group, fired a U.S.-made TOW missile at a Russian helicopter on the ground. The rescue helicopter was on a search mission for the pilots of the Su-24 jet shot down by Turkey in Syria on November 24. The FSA has received US Tow missiles among other weaponry. Also in November, rebels attacked journalists with a US-made anti-tank missile. . .

Obama warns of small-scale ISIS attacks in the U.S. Reuters / August 4, 2016 President Barack Obama on Thursday touted progress he said the United States and its allies had made in the military campaign against Islamic State, but warned that the militant group still can direct and inspire attacks. The United States is leading a military coalition conducting air strikes against Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, where the group seized broad swathes of territory in 2014. It has succeeded in breaking Islamic State's grip on some towns, although it still controls its two de facto capitals, Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria. The president, criticized for suggesting Islamic State was made up of amateurs, presented a more measured assessment on Thursday. He said the last two years of the U.S.-led air and ground campaign have proved that the extremist group can be beaten in conventional military fights but that it has shown the ability to carry out damaging, small-scale attacks. "I am pleased with the progress that we've made on the ground in Iraq and Syria," said Obama, but he added: "We're far from freeing Mosul and Raqqa." While the campaign against Islamic State in Iraq, Syria and now Libya is making significant gains, the group is adapting, reverting to high-profile attacks and using the internet to recruit and train, and to encourage "lone wolf" attacks. "They've seen the degree of attention they can get with smaller-scale attacks using small arms or assault rifles," Obama said. "The possibility of either a lone actor or a small cell carrying out an attack that kills people is real." The United States must do a better job of disrupting Islamic State networks that can carry out attacks far from the group's bases in the Middle East, Obama said. "Those networks are more active in Europe than they are here, but we don't know what we don't know, and so it's conceivable that there are some networks here [in the U.S.] that could be activated," he said. "How we react to this is as important as the efforts we take to destroy ISIS, prevent these networks from penetrating," he said, using an acronym for the group. "When societies get scared they can react in ways that undermine the fabric of our society." COORDINATING WITH RUSSIA In Syria, where the United States is [finally] exploring options to cooperate with Russia militarily to defeat Islamic State, Obama said Russia's and Syria's most recent actions have raised doubts about their commitment to a pause in the conflict. This week, a Syrian rescue service operating in rebel-held territory said a helicopter dropped containers of toxic gas overnight on a town close to where a Russian military helicopter had been shot down hours earlier. http://www.bigmacktrucks.com/topic/41827-syria/?page=3#comment-341272 The opposition Syrian National Coalition accused President Bashar al-Assad of being behind the attack. Assad has denied previous accusations of using chemical weapons. The twin U.S. goals in Syria have been to end the violence that has claimed some 400,000 lives, according to United Nations estimates, and to seek a political process to replace Assad, whom Obama has said "must go." Proposals for the United States and Russia to cooperate in Syria would have them share intelligence to coordinate air strikes and prohibit the Syrian air force from attacking rebel groups considered moderate. But U.S. military and intelligence officials have called the plan naive and said U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry risks falling into a trap that Russian President Vladimir Putin has laid to discredit the United States with moderate rebel groups and drive some of their fighters into the arms of Islamic State and other extremist groups. "The U.S. remains prepared to work with Russia to try to reduce the violence and strengthen our efforts against ISIS and al Qaeda in Syria, but so far Russia has failed to take the necessary steps," Obama said, adding that he was not confident Russia or Putin could be trusted.

How a Secretive Branch of ISIS Built a Global Network of Killers The New York Times / August 3, 2016 A jailhouse interview with a German man who joined the Islamic State reveals the workings of a unit whose lieutenants are empowered to plan attacks around the world. Believing he was answering a holy call, Harry Sarfo left his home in the working-class city of Bremen last year and drove for four straight days to reach the territory controlled by the Islamic State in Syria. He barely had time to settle in before members of the Islamic State’s secret service, wearing masks over their faces, came to inform him and his German friend that they no longer wanted Europeans to come to Syria. Where they were really needed was back home, to help carry out the group’s plan of waging terrorism across the globe. “He was speaking openly about the situation, saying that they have loads of people living in European countries and waiting for commands to attack the European people,” Mr. Sarfo recounted on Monday, in an interview with The New York Times conducted in English inside the maximum-security prison near Bremen. “And that was before the Brussels attacks, before the Paris attacks.” The masked man explained that, although the group was well set up in some European countries, it needed more attackers in Germany and Britain, in particular. “They said, ‘Would you mind to go back to Germany, because that’s what we need at the moment,’” Mr. Sarfo recalled. “And they always said they wanted to have something that is occurring in the same time: They want to have loads of attacks at the same time in England and Germany and France.” The operatives belonged to an intelligence unit of the Islamic State known in Arabic as the Emni, which has become a combination of an internal police force and an external operations branch, dedicated to exporting terror abroad, according to thousands of pages of French, Belgian, German and Austrian intelligence and interrogation documents obtained by The Times. The Islamic State’s attacks in Paris on Nov. 13 brought global attention to the group’s external terrorism network, which began sending fighters abroad two years ago. Now, Mr. Sarfo’s account, along with those of other captured recruits, has further pulled back the curtain on the group’s machinery for projecting violence beyond its borders. What they describe is a multi-level secret service under the overall command of the Islamic State’s most senior Syrian operative, spokesman and propaganda chief, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani. Below him is a tier of lieutenants empowered to plan attacks in different regions of the world, including a “secret service for European affairs,” a “secret service for Asian affairs” and a “secret service for Arab affairs.” Reinforcing the idea that the Emni is a core part of the Islamic State’s operations, the interviews and documents indicate that the unit has carte blanche to recruit and reroute operatives from all parts of the organization — from new arrivals to seasoned battlefield fighters, and from the group’s special forces and its elite commando units. Taken together, the interrogation records show that operatives are selected by nationality and grouped by language into small, discrete units whose members sometimes only meet one another on the eve of their departure abroad. And through the coordinating role played by Mr. Adnani, terror planning has gone hand-in-hand with the group’s extensive propaganda operations — including monthly meetings in which Mr. Adnani chose which grisly videos to promote based on battlefield events. Based on the accounts of operatives arrested so far, the Emni has become the crucial cog in the group’s terrorism machinery, and its trainees led the Paris attacks and built the suitcase bombs used in a Brussels airport terminal and subway station. Investigation records show that its foot soldiers have also been sent to Austria, Germany, Spain, Lebanon, Tunisia, Bangladesh, Indonesia and Malaysia. With European officials stretched by a string of assaults by seemingly unconnected attackers who pledged allegiance to ISIS, Mr. Sarfo suggested that there may be more of a link than the authorities yet know. He was told that undercover operatives in Europe used new converts as go-betweens, or “clean men,” who help link up people interested in carrying out attacks with operatives who can pass on instructions on everything from how to make a suicide vest to how to credit their violence to the Islamic State. The group has sent “hundreds of operatives” back to the European Union, with “hundreds more in Turkey alone,” according to a senior United States intelligence official and a senior American defense official, both of whom spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss intelligence. Mr. Sarfo agrees with that assessment. “Many of them have returned,” he said. “Hundreds, definitely.” Vetting Recruits The first port of call for new arrivals to the Islamic State is a network of dormitories in Syria, just across the border from Turkey. There, recruits are interviewed and inventoried. Mr. Sarfo was fingerprinted, and a doctor came to draw a blood sample and perform a physical examination. A man with a laptop conducted an intake interview. “He was asking normal questions like: ‘What’s your name? What’s your second name? Who’s your mom? Where’s your mom originally from? What did you study? What degree do you have? What’s your ambition? What do you want to become?’” Mr. Sarfo said. His background was also of interest. He was a regular at a radical mosque in Bremen that had already sent about 20 members to Syria, at least four of whom were killed in battle, according to Daniel Heinke, the German Interior Ministry’s counterterrorism coordinator for the area. And he had served a one-year prison sentence for breaking into a supermarket safe and stealing 23,000 euros. Even though the punishment for theft in areas under Islamic State control is amputation, a criminal past can be a valued asset, Mr. Sarfo said, “especially if they know you have ties to organized crime and they know you can get fake IDs, or they know you have contact men in Europe who can smuggle you into the European Union.” The bureaucratic nature of the intake procedure was recently confirmed by American officials after USB drives were recovered in the recently liberated Syrian city of Manbij, one of the hubs for processing foreign fighters. Mr. Sarfo checked all the necessary boxes, and on the third day after his arrival, the members of the Emni came to ask for him. He wanted to fight in Syria and Iraq, but the masked operatives explained that they had a vexing problem. “They told me that there aren’t many people in Germany who are willing to do the job,” Mr. Sarfo said soon after his arrest last year, according to the transcript of his interrogation by German officials, which runs more than 500 pages. “They said they had some in the beginning. But one after another, you could say, they chickened out, because they got scared — cold feet. Same in England.” By contrast, the group had more than enough volunteers for France. “My friend asked them about France,” Mr. Sarfo said. “And they started laughing. But really serious laughing, with tears in their eyes. They said, ‘Don’t worry about France.’ ‘Mafi mushkilah’ — in Arabic, it means ‘no problem.’” That conversation took place in April 2015, seven months before the coordinated killings in Paris in November, the worst terrorist attack in Europe in over a decade. While some details of Mr. Sarfo’s account cannot be verified, his statements track with what other recruits related in their interrogations. And both prison officials and the German intelligence agents who debriefed Mr. Sarfo after his arrest said they found him credible. Since the rise of the Islamic State over two years ago, intelligence agencies have been collecting nuggets on the Emni. Originally, the unit was tasked with policing the Islamic State’s members, including conducting interrogations and ferreting out spies, according to interrogation records and analysts. But French members arrested in 2014 and 2015 explained that the Emni had taken on a new portfolio: projecting terror abroad. “It’s the Emni that ensures the internal security inside Dawla” — the Arabic word for state — “and oversees external security by sending abroad people they recruited, or else sending individuals to carry out violent acts, like what happened in Tunisia inside the museum in Tunis, or else the aborted plot in Belgium,” said Nicolas Moreau, 32, a French citizen who was arrested last year after leaving the Islamic State in Syria, according to his statement to France’s domestic intelligence agency. Mr. Moreau explained that he had run a restaurant in Raqqa, Syria, the de facto capital of the group’s territory, where he had served meals to key members of the Emni — including Abdelhamid Abaaoud, the on-the-ground commander of the Paris attacks, who was killed in a standoff with the police days later. Other interrogations, as well as Mr. Sarfo’s account, have led investigators to conclude that the Emni also trained and dispatched the gunman who opened fire on a beach in Sousse, Tunisia, in June, and the man who prepared the Brussels airport bombs. Records from French, Austrian and Belgian intelligence agencies show that at least 28 operatives recruited by the Emni succeeded in deploying to countries outside of the Islamic State’s core territory, mounting both successful attacks and plots that were foiled. Officials say that dozens of other operatives have slipped through and formed sleeper cells. In his own interactions with the Emni, Mr. Sarfo realized that they were preparing a global portfolio of terrorists and looking to fill holes in their international network, he said. He described what he had been told about the group’s work to build an infrastructure in Bangladesh. There, a siege by a team of Islamic State gunmen left at least 20 hostages dead at a cafe last month, almost all of them foreigners. Mr. Sarfo said that for Asian recruits, the group was looking specifically for militants who had emerged from Al Qaeda’s network in the region. “People especially from Bangladesh, Malaysia and Indonesia — they have people who used to work for Al Qaeda, and once they joined the Islamic State, they are asking them questions about their experiences and if they have contacts,” he said. In his briefings with the German authorities, Mr. Sarfo raised the possibility that some of the recent attackers in Europe who pledged allegiance to the Islamic State’s leader during their assaults might have a more direct link to the group than officials believe. Mr. Sarfo explained that the Emni keeps many of its operatives underground in Europe. They act as nodes that can remotely activate potential suicide attackers who have been drawn in by propaganda. Linking them are what Mr. Sarfo called “clean men,” new converts to Islam with no established ties to radical groups. “These people are not in direct contact with these guys who are doing the attacks, because they know if these people start talking, they will get caught,” he said of the underground operatives. “They mostly use people who are new Muslims, who are converts,” he said. Those “clean” converts “get in contact with the people, and they give them the message.” And in the case of some videotaped pledges of allegiance, the go-between can then send the video on to the handler in Europe, who uploads it for use by the Islamic State’s propaganda channels. The intelligence documents and Mr. Sarfo agree that the Islamic State has made the most of its recruits’ nationalities by sending them back to plot attacks at home. Yet one important region where the Emni is not thought to have succeeded in sending trained attackers is North America, Mr. Sarfo said, recalling what the members of the branch told him. Though dozens of Americans have become members of the Islamic State, and some have been recruited into the external operations wing, “they know it’s hard for them to get Americans into America” once they have traveled to Syria, he said. “For America and Canada, it’s much easier for them to get them over the social network, because they say the Americans are dumb — they have open gun policies,” he said. “They say we can radicalize them easily, and if they have no prior record, they can buy guns, so we don’t need to have no contact man who has to provide guns for them.” Training Days Since late 2014, the Islamic State has instructed foreigners joining the group to make their trip look like a holiday in southern Turkey, including booking a return flight and paying for an all-inclusive vacation at a beach resort, from which smugglers arrange their transport into Syria, according to intelligence documents and Mr. Sarfo’s account. That cover story creates pressure to keep things moving quickly during the recruits’ training in Syria, and most get a bare minimum — just a few days of basic weapons practice, in some instances. “When they go back to France or in Germany, they can say, ‘I was only on holidays in Turkey,’” Mr. Sarfo said. “The longer they stay in the Islamic State, the more suspicious the secret service in the West gets, and that’s why they try to do the training as quickly as possible.” Mr. Sarfo’s language proficiency in both German and English — he studied construction at Newham College in East London — made him attractive as a potential attacker. Though the Emni approached him several times to ask him to return to Germany, he demurred, he said. Eventually, Mr. Sarfo, perhaps because of his burly build — 6-foot-1 and around 286 pounds when he arrived in Syria, though he has lost weight since then — was drafted into the Islamic State’s quwat khas, Arabic for special forces. The unit only admitted single men who agreed not to marry during the duration of their training. In addition to providing the offensive force to infiltrate cities during battles, it was one of several elite units that became recruiting pools for the external operations branch, Mr. Sarfo said. Along with his German friend, he was driven to the desert outside Raqqa. “They dropped us off in the middle of nowhere and told us, ‘We are here,’” he said. “So we’re standing in the desert and thought to ourselves, ‘What’s going on?’” When the two Germans looked more closely, they realized there were cavelike dwellings around them. Everything above ground was painted with mud so as to be invisible to drones. “Showering was prohibited. Eating was prohibited, too, unless they gave it to you,” Mr. Sarfo said, adding that he had shared a cave with five or six others. Even drinking water was harshly rationed. “Each dwelling received two cups of water a day, put on the doorstep,” he said. “And the purpose of this was to test us, see who really wants it, who’s firm.” The grueling training began: hours of running, jumping, push-ups, parallel bars, crawling. The recruits began fainting. By the second week, they were each given a Kalashnikov assault rifle and told to sleep with it between their legs until it became “like a third arm,” he said. The punishment for failing to keep up was harsh. “There was one boy who refused to get up, because he was just too exhausted,” Mr. Sarfo told the authorities. “So they tied him to a pole with his legs and his arms and left him there.” He learned that the special forces program involved 10 levels of training. After he graduated to Level 2, he was moved to an island on a river in Tabqa, Syria. The recruits’ sleeping spots now consisted of holes in the ground, covered by sticks and twigs. They practiced swimming, scuba diving and navigating by the stars. Throughout his training, Mr. Sarfo rubbed shoulders with an international cadre of recruits. When he first arrived at the desert campus, he ran laps alongside Moroccans, Egyptians, at least one Indonesian, a Canadian and a Belgian. And out on the island, he learned of similar special units, including one called Jaysh al-Khalifa, or the Army of the Caliphate. A 12-page criminal complaint indicates that the Islamic State tried to recruit at least one American into that unit, but he declined to enroll. The man, Mohamad Jamal Khweis, a 26-year-old from Alexandria, Virginia, traveled to Syria in December, only to be captured by Kurdish troops in Iraq in March. In his debriefing with the FBI, he explained that early on, he was approached by members of the unit. “During his stay at this safe house, representatives from Jaysh Khalifa, a group described by the defendant as an ‘offensive group,’ visited the new ISIS recruits. The representatives explained that their group was responsible for accepting volunteers from foreign countries who would be trained and sent back to their countries to conduct operations and execute attacks on behalf of ISIL. The group’s requirements, among other things, were that recruits had to be single, would train in remote locations, must be free of any injuries and had to stay reclusive when returning to their home countries.” The Big Man As he progressed through the special forces training, Mr. Sarfo became closer with the emir of the camp, a Moroccan, who began to divulge details about how the Islamic State’s external operations effort was structured, he said. Mr. Sarfo learned that there was one outsize figure behind the group’s strategies and ambitions. “The big man behind everything is Abu Muhammad al-Adnani,” he said. “He is the head of the Emni, and he is the head of the special forces as well,” Mr. Sarfo added. “Everything goes back to him.” Born in the town of Binnish in northern Syria, Mr. Adnani is said to be 39, and is the subject of a $5 million bounty from the State Department’s Rewards for Justice program. But details about his life remain a mystery. There are very few available photos of him, and the one used on the State Department’s website is years old. Mr. Sarfo explained that when recruits to the special forces finished all 10 levels of training, they were blindfolded and driven to meet Mr. Adnani, where they pledged allegiance to him directly. Mr. Sarfo was told that the blindfolds stayed on the whole time, so that even Mr. Adnani’s best-trained fighters never know what he looks like. To the world, Mr. Adnani is better known as the official spokesman of the Islamic State, and the man who put out a global call this year for Muslims to attack unbelievers wherever they were, however they could. “Adnani is much more than just the mouthpiece of this group,” said Thomas Joscelyn, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in Washington who tracks the group’s leadership. “He is heavily involved in external operations. He is sort of the administrative ‘yea’ or ‘nay’ at the top of the pyramid,” who signs off on attack plans, the details of which are handled by his subordinates. During his time in Syria, Mr. Sarfo was contacted by other German fighters who wanted him to be an actor in a propaganda film aimed at German speakers. They drove to Palmyra, and Mr. Sarfo was told to hold the group’s black flag and to walk again and again in front of the camera as they filmed repeated takes. Syrian captives were forced to kneel, and the other German fighters shot them, showing an interest only in the cinematic effect. One turned to Mr. Sarfo immediately after killing a victim and asked: “How did I look like? Did I look good, the way I executed?” Mr. Sarfo said he had learned that videos like the one he acted in were vetted by Mr. Adnani himself in a monthly meeting of senior operatives. “There’s a vetting procedure,” he said. “Once a month they have a shura — which is a sitting, a meeting — where all the videos and everything that is important, they start speaking about it. And Abu Muhammad al-Adnani is the head of the shura.” Mr. Sarfo said he had started doubting his allegiance to ISIS during his training, after seeing how cruelly they treated those who could not keep up. Making the propaganda video provided his final disillusionment when he saw how many times they recorded each scene in the five-minute film. Back in Germany, when he had been inspired by similar videos, he had always assumed they were real, not staged. He began plotting his escape, which took weeks and involved sprinting and crawling in a field of mud before crossing into Turkey. He was arrested at Bremen Airport, where he landed on July 20, 2015, and he voluntarily confessed. He is now serving a three-year term on terrorism charges. The Lieutenants Among the Islamic State’s innovations is the role of foreigners, especially Europeans, in the planning of attacks. Mr. Sarfo’s account agrees with investigation documents and the assessments of terrorism experts, who say that French and Belgian citizens like Mr. Abaaoud are more than just operatives and have been given managing roles. “It’s a creative and interesting operational road map, to be able to lean on someone like Abaaoud, who has his own network abroad,” said Jean-Charles Brisard, chairman of the Center for the Analysis of Terrorism in Paris. “They gave him the autonomy regarding tactics and strategy, even if the operation as a whole still needs a green light from the Islamic State’s leadership.” Looking at the current leaders of the Emni, investigators have homed in on two in particular. They go by the aliases Abu Souleymane, a French citizen, and Abu Ahmad, described as Syrian. Both are considered top lieutenants of Mr. Adnani, according to the senior American defense official and senior intelligence official. The two men play a direct role in identifying fighters to be sent overseas, in choosing targets and in organizing logistics for operatives, including paying for smugglers to get them to Europe and, in at least one case, sending Western Union transfers, according to European intelligence documents. A glimpse into the possible role of Abu Souleymane came from one of the hostages held by suicide bombers inside the Bataclan concert hall in Paris in November. After gunning down dozens of concertgoers, two of the suicide bombers retreated into a hallway with a group of hostages, forcing them to sit against the windows as human shields, said the hostage, David Fritz-Goeppinger, 24. In the two-and-a-half-hour standoff that ensued, Mr. Fritz heard one of the bombers ask the other, “Should we call Souleymane?” The second operative appeared annoyed that the first had asked the question in French, and ordered him to switch to Arabic. “I immediately understood that, yes, this was the individual, maybe not the individual who had organized the attack, but who held a place in the hierarchy above them,” said Mr. Fritz. His testimony is also included in a detailed, 51-page report by France’s antiterrorism police. “They were absolutely, like soldiers,” awaiting orders, he said. Souleymane, whose full nom de guerre is Abu Souleymane al-Faransi, or Abu Souleymane the Frenchman, is believed to be a French national in his 30s who is of either Moroccan or Tunisian ancestry, according to Ludovico Carlino, a senior analyst with IHS Conflict Monitor in London. Mr. Carlino says he believes that Souleymane was promoted to be the top terrorism planner for Europe after Mr. Abaaoud’s death. A snapshot of the other senior leader, Abu Ahmad, appears in the account of a man who investigators have concluded was supposed to be part of the team of Paris attackers: an Algerian named Adel Haddadi. Mr. Haddadi said he and another member of the team, a former Lashkar-e-Taiba member from Pakistan named Muhammad Usman, were separated from two other attackers after they reached Greece by boat. Mr. Haddadi, 28, and Mr. Usman, 22, were eventually arrested in a migrant camp in Salzburg, Austria. The two men sent alongside them became the first suicide bombers to detonate their vests outside the Stade de France during the November attacks. After arriving in Syria and being routed to the international dormitory there in February 2015, Mr. Haddadi worked as a cook in Raqqa for months before a member of the Emni came to see him, according to French and Austrian investigation documents. “One day, a Syrian came into the kitchen to see me and said that someone called Abu Ahmad wanted to see me,” Mr. Haddadi was quoted as saying in the Austrian record of his interrogation. He was driven to a five-story building, where another Syrian holding a walkie talkie radioed Abu Ahmad. They waited for hours before the Syrian got orders to drive the recruit to the next location. In the street, a Saudi man wearing all white was waiting, and asked Mr. Haddadi to go on a walk. After 300 yards, they reached an empty apartment building and sat down. “I was scared, I wanted to leave, but he talked the whole time,” Mr. Haddadi told the authorities. “He said only positive things about me, that Daesh trusted me and that I now needed to prove myself worthy of that trust. He said that Daesh was going to send me to France,” Mr. Haddadi added, using the Arabic acronym for the Islamic State. “The details, he said, I would get them once I arrived in France.” Sometime after that, Abu Ahmad arrived. Mr. Haddadi described him as a Syrian man between 38 and 42 years old, slim with a long, black beard, and dressed all in black. He was, Mr. Haddadi said, “the giver of orders.” Abu Ahmad brought Mr. Haddadi together with three other potential attackers, with the last man, Mr. Usman, being introduced just a day before they all set out for Europe. Mr. Haddadi and two of the other men were native Arabic speakers, and Mr. Usman spoke enough Arabic to communicate with them, the interrogation documents said. The day of their departure, Abu Ahmad came and gave them his Turkish cellphone number, instructing them to store it in their phone as “FF,” to avoid registering a name. He gave Mr. Haddadi $2,000 in $100 bills, and they were driven to the Turkish border. A man met them in Turkey to take their photographs, and returned with Syrian passports. Another smuggler arranged their Oct. 3 boat trip to Leros, Greece. All of these logistical steps, as well as Western Union money transfers, were organized by Abu Ahmad, one of the senior lieutenants running the Islamic State’s efforts to export terror. Until his arrest in December, Mr. Haddadi remained in touch with Abu Ahmad through messages on Telegram and via text messages to his Turkish number, according to the investigation record. Abu Ahmad’s Turkish number was found somewhere else, too: written on a slip of paper in the pants pocket of the severed leg of one of the suicide bombers at the Stade de France. Video - http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/04/world/middleeast/isis-german-recruit-interview.html?_r=0

Woman dies after trying to save grandchildren from sex offender The Columbus Dispatch / August 4, 2016 The man told Candy Arthurs and her two grandchildren that he was looking for a lost drone, and the trio was happy to help him look for it. But shortly after they began searching their Hilltop neighborhood June 23, Jeremy Mullins, 7, and Kourtnee Mullins, 8, started walking into an alley with the man, who turned out to be a convicted sex offender. Though it's unclear what happened next, Arthurs — who always said she'd sacrifice her life for her grandchildren — confronted the man. He stabbed her in the heart with a large knife and also stabbed Jeremy in the shoulder, Columbus police say. Wednesday morning, Arthurs, 45, died at Mount Carmel West hospital from the wound she suffered six weeks ago. The attacker, Kristopher T. Amos, 29, has been charged with murder and was in the Franklin County jail Wednesday night. Amos, who lives in the 200 block of North Wayne Avenue, just down the street from Gibson's house, is a registered sex offender and twice was found guilty of child enticement with a sexual motivation, in 2010 and 2011. During the first incident, Amos tried to lure children into the shower area of a YMCA. He'd been charged with two counts of felonious assault after the June 23 stabbing, but he wasn't arrested until 10 a.m. Wednesday, after he was charged with murder. He was picked up at his employer on Worthington Road. After her mother and son were stabbed, Gibson's neighbors on the Hilltop told her that Amos also had solicited their children for help, claiming he lost a drone. He was carrying a remote control with him. Arthurs' death is the city's 58th homicide this year. .

Man in Charlotte recruiting for ISIS, planning training compound The Charlotte Observer / August 4, 2016 A man who had lived in Charlotte about a month was arrested Thursday, accused of trying to recruit domestic terrorists for ISIS and claiming to be planning a secret training camp on U.S. soil. Erick Jamal Hendricks, 35, used social media networks to contact and recruit Americans for the cause of ISIS, and appeared to have ties to a 2015 attack at a Texas event mocking pictures of the prophet Muhammad. Hendricks was obsessed with security while connecting on social media sites, unbeknownst that he’d been communicating with an FBI undercover operative and others who’d agreed to cooperate with investigators. In a March 2015 meeting in Baltimore with others he believed to be part of his ISIS ring, Hendricks said he had land in Arkansas where he could “get off the grid” and prepare for bloody battle with law enforcement. Three months later, Hendricks told the FBI operative that he wanted to construct a training center “hidden in plain sight … Farm, house, garden, tunnels.” In communications with others, Hendricks claimed to have 10 operatives in the United States and hoped to raid military depots for weapons. Until being charged Thursday with providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization, a crime that carries a sentence up to 15 years, Hendricks only had minor traffic infractions on his record. Hendricks grew up in Woodson, Arkansas, near Little Rock, and until recently had been living in Virginia. Began in Ohio Hendricks’ case appears to have dovetailed with an arrest in Ohio in June 2015. Federal authorities said that an unidentified man in the Cleveland area tried to buy an AK-47 assault rifle and ammunition from an undercover officer. He later pleaded guilty to attempting to provide material support to a designated terrorist organization and two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm. He had an extensive criminal record including four felony convictions for drug trafficking. He entered into a plea agreement with the federal government that allowed for a reduced sentence if he cooperated with investigators. He told the FBI that he had been contacted by Hendricks through social media in the spring of 2015 as a possible ISIS recruit after pledging allegiance to ISIS and indicating on social media he would be interested in conducting attacks in the United States. Hendricks told the man he “needed people” and wanted to meet with him. Hendricks also told the man that there were “brothers” in Texas and Mexico; that he was attempting to “get brothers to meet face to face;” and that he wanted “to get brothers to train together.” Hendricks tested the man’s religious knowledge and commitment to Islam, asking whether he’d be willing to commit “jihad,” to die as a “martyr” and his desire to enter paradise. The Ohio man took this to mean that Hendricks was seeking recruits for a terrorist attack in the U.S. and to find out if the man was a suitable candidate. Hendricks also criticized the Ohio man for his involvement in selling marijuana, saying it was an affront to Muslim faith. On his Facebook page, Hendricks wrote in 2014: “I have not smoked one blunt or dranked one drop of liquar; or had one single, solitary act of sex outside of marriage; or defiled my body with the prohibited meat (meat) in almost 15 years.” FBI informant Hendricks had also been talking through social media to someone working undercover for the FBI. On April 16, 2015, Hendricks told the FBI operative to download the document “GPS for the Ghuraba in the U.S.” Among other instructions, the document encouraged followers to die as martyrs rather than be arrested and jailed. “Boobie trap your homes,” “lay in wait for them” and to “never leave your home without your AK-47 or M16,” the document advised. Hendricks kept in contact with the FBI operative and at least two other confidential informants on the federal payroll, authorities say. He changed online identities regularly and instructed them on security protocols so they wouldn’t be detected by federal investigators. At one point, Hendricks told the FBI operative that he worked full-time as a recruiter and “It’s hard to sift through brothers” and “Allah chooses only the few.” Attack on contest On April 23, 2015, Hendricks contacted a man named Elton Simpson through social media. Along with Nadir Hamid Soofi, Simpson launched the ISIS-inspired attack on the “First Annual Muhammad Art Exhibit and Contest” in Garland, Texas on May 3, 2015. It followed the January 2015 attack on the French humor magazine Charlie Hebdo, which had run mocking cartoons of the prophet Muhammad. Creating depictions of Muhammad is forbidden in Islamic beliefs. Simpson and Soofi wounded a security guard and were killed by Garland police guarding the event. Hendricks had been in touch with Simpson through social media and urged the FBI’s undercover operative to attend the contest on the day of the attack. Hendricks asked the operative on the day of the attack through social media questions about security: “How many police/agents?”, “Do you see feds there?’ “Do you see snipers?” Hendricks asked through messages. Hendricks’ next court appearance, a detention hearing, is scheduled for Tuesday in Charlotte before U.S. Magistrate David Cayer. .

Glad we could help you. It's hard to operate a Mack in Nigeria without any acceptable after-sales support.

Looking at the engine, what is that Renault engine's model number?

Ottawa-Brimont "Commando" (the French Unimog) 4-wheel drive 4-wheel steer center pivot Brimont ETR articulated 4x4 built at Rethel, Ardennes, from 1974 to the end of the 90s. They had a distribution agreement with Ottawa between 1986 and 1998. Brimont was taken over by Legris Potain Poclain PPM in 1989. CAT distributor Bergerat Monnoyeur bought the Brimont off-road vehicle unit in 1987. In 1989, the company was called Brimont PM. Off-road vehicle production ended in 1993. Brimont today is a small trailer manufacturer. http://s3.e-monsite.com/2011/03/16/786277084x4-brimont-bergerat-monnoyeur-pdf.pdf http://s3.e-monsite.com/2011/03/16/23346963brimont-p-l-12-5-pdf.pdf http://www.monnoyeur.com/Website/site/eng_accueil.htm

Sorry, I do have E6/672 2V specifications. .

I realize you're in Nigeria, but you should try to purchase a used Mack "TS442" service manual on Amazon.com I only have E6 4V information, but the dimensions you're seeking are the same. .

Haldex board recommends ZF takeover offer, rejects SAF-Holland bid Reuters / August 4, 2016 Swedish brake systems supplier Haldex said its board has recommended shareholders to approve a 4.4 billion crown ($515 million) cash offer by ZF Friedrichshafen and reject a separate takeover bid by SAF-Holland. Haldex said in July it had been approached by two suitors, including commercial vehicle components maker SAF-Holland. It did not name ZF at the time. Haldex said in a statement today that ZF's offer was "clearly superior" to a 4.2 billion crown bid by SAF-Holland. Haldex said it had considered risks associated with operating in a highly competitive automotive market with tight margins. "Haldex has significantly lower sales than the two largest players in the market," it said. "Because of its relatively small size, Haldex is more exposed to these risks than other larger players in the market." ZF said it planned to invest in Haldex, not cut costs. "It is ZF's intention to develop and expand Haldex technologically and regionally as part of the worldwide activities of ZF Group, especially in its commercial vehicles business," ZF said in a statement. No decisions have been made on the integration of Haldex within ZF Group, including as regards changes to employees or management. ZF acquired TRW Automotive last year. It supplies technological solutions to the automotive sector and has a global workforce of around 138,300 in some 40 countries and reported sales of 29.2 billion euros in 2015. Haldex, a leading supplier of brake adjusters, has 2,200 employees in 18 countries. It said ZF's cash offer represented a premium of approximately 34.4 percent per share compared to Haldex's volume-weighted average price during the three months prior to the announcement of SAF-Holland's bid on July 14. The premium was largely in line with recent takeover offers for listed Swedish manufacturing companies. Finland's Scanfil, for example, paid a 27 percent premium for Sweden's Partnertech last year. Premiums in initial offers for metal-powder maker Hoganas and humidity control firm Munters were 17 percent and 30 percent respectively. Both ended up being bought out at a higher price. The acceptance period will start on August 22 and expire on or around September 30.

KrAZ Trucks Press Release / August 3, 2016 .

Australasian Transport News (ATN) / August 4, 2016 Researchers say test showed ease of attack on American trucks and buses US researchers are due to report on the potential for hacking an articulated truck’s computers in that country. Current affairs website Wired has looked into the issue a year after it made headlines on the remote hacking of two passenger vehicles, where computer assisted controls were taken over as they were driving. Now University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute (UMITRI) researchers plan to unveil their findings on the remote interference of a semi-trailer’s braking and acceleration, at the Usenix Workshop on Offensive Technologies conference next week. In their abstract for the workshop, UMITRI researchers Yelizaveta Burakova, Bill Hass, Leif Millar, and André Weimerskirch highlight the vulnerability of the Society of Automotive Engineers’ SAE J1939 standard used for large vehicle communications and diagnostics. All trucks on the Australian market use the J1939 code. It is a universal language for electronic systems, though it is understood messages can be and are coded and therefore not be prone to hacking. "Consumer vehicles have been proven to be insecure; the addition of electronics to monitor and control vehicle functions have added complexity resulting in safety critical vulnerabilities," the UMITRI abstract says. "Heavy commercial vehicles have also begun adding electronic control systems similar to consumer vehicles. "We show how the openness of the SAE J1939 standard used across all US heavy vehicle industries gives easy access for safety-critical attacks and that these attacks aren't limited to one specific make, model, or industry. "We test our attacks on a 2006 Class-8 semi tractor and 2001 school bus. "With these two vehicles, we demonstrate how simple it is to replicate the kinds of attacks used on consumer vehicles and that it is possible to use the same attack on other vehicles that use the SAE J1939 standard. "We show safety critical attacks that include the ability to accelerate a truck in motion, disable the driver's ability to accelerate, and disable the vehicle's engine brake. "We conclude with a discussion for possibilities of additional attacks and potential remote attack vectors." The full paper is to be made available after the workshop. The news comes after US industry technology publication trucks.com reported in mid-May that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) had sought out UMITRI last year for an examination of cybersecurity and long-haul trucks, with Weimerskirch leading the project. The workshop will be held on Monday, two weeks after US president Barack Obama signed Presidential Policy Directive – United States Cyber IncidentCoordination that outlines his government’s roles and approach for responding to significant cyber incidents. US national industry body American Trucking Associations is to hold an August 24 webinar on ‘vehicle-to-everything’ (V2X) vulnerabilities in trucks. "The trucking industry needs to outline whose role will it be to look after their best interests as well. "With 100 per cent uncertainty as to how safe V2X will be; how secure a truck’s communications currently are; and what everyone else is doing about it, trucks could become criminal pawns with minimal effort by cyber adversaries." In Australia, when the US car hacking report surfaced last year, the Truck Industry Council (TIC) was firm that local truck cybersecurity defences were in line with those in Europe and more stringent than in the US. TIC is drawing together a considered response to the issue. "TIC has referred the issues raised in the US article to its members, who supply a range of European, Japanese and USA trucks in the Australian market and requested their comment and feedback," chief technical officer Mark Hammond says. "Based on the information received TIC will respond in due course." The NHTSA and UMITRI have all been contacted for further comment and details. It is understood that truck makers here are confident of their own systems but less so where third-party systems are wired directly into a vehicle’s controller area network (CAN) rather than through the vehicle’s secured CAN interface.

Radical Islamists attack city bus in Paris Associated Press / August 3, 2016 Shouting “Allahu Akbar” (God is Great), radical Islamists set a city municipal transit bus on fire with Molotov cocktails after blocking its way with makeshift barricade in Paris. The perpetrators were reportedly The attack occurred in the Paris suburb of Saint-Denis last week. A group of young men rolled trash containers into the street in front of an approaching bus to “set up a trap to force the bus to stop,” police said. After forcing the articulated bus to a halt, the attackers forced the driver and passengers out. The men then start kicking the bus and smashing its windows, before finally throwing Molotov cocktails at the vehicle, causing an explosion and a massive fire. “This act of premeditated vandalism, the consequences of which have been tragic, follows an attempted homicide on a worker by a Molotov cocktail on July 22 and buildings being looted,” Saint-Denis mayor Didier Paillard told Le Parisien. The Saint-Denis district, known for a high immigrant population, has been a scene of similar unrest in the previous years. In 2005, massive riots swept through the area, with thousands of cars burned to ashes. The following year, unease over the arrest of a teenager for attacking a bus driver led to more street protests and violence, eventually involving riot police. Several buses also came under attack in Saint-Denis in 2010, with one set ablaze with a Molotov cocktail while others torched. The November 2015 wave of terrorist attacks in Paris also affected Saint-Denis. One of the suspected masterminds of the atrocities was killed in a standoff with police and army after he was located by law enforcement in the district. .

Commercial Motor TV - sponsored by DAF Trucks / August 3, 2016 .

Fleet Owner / August 3, 2016 Medium-duty orders down as well, but not steep as those for Class 8 A deep decline in Class 8 orders for the month of July is not surprising trucking industry analysts all that much, as both freight demand and rates remain subdued. North American Class 8 orders slumped to 10,500 units in July, down 19% from June, down 57% year-over-year, and marking the lowest order level since the first quarter of 2010. Orders for medium duty trucks – Class 5 through 7 – also declined in July, but not by as much as in the Class 8 segment. Class 5-7 orders dipped down to 14,500 units, down 4% from June and 6% year-over-year. In line with the two-speed U.S. economy of healthy consumers and weak industrial activity, the two-speed commercial vehicle story continued to unfold in July. Medium duty orders remained on trend, while Class 8 orders continued to soften, with some of that softness related to seasonality as of July-September, the traditional low ebb for Classes 5-8 vehicle orders. Research firm FTR’s data indicated net Class 8 order volume for July dipped to 10,400 units, 56% below the same month in 2015 and the weakest month since February 2010 – dropping “annualized” Class 8 order volume to 210,000 units for the year. “Usually there are a low number of cancellations in July, but not this year,” said FTR vice president Don Ake. “The high cancellations are likely the result of fleets placing large orders at the end of 2015, for delivery a year out.” He added that without the cancellations, July orders would have been similar to June’s numbers. But with those cancelations included, month-to-month order volume dipped 19%. “Freight growth remains sluggish, so fleets are backing off expanding the number of truck,” Ake pointed out. “They are expected to continue to replace older units in the short-term, however. Orders should increase some in August.” Another analyst noted that July’s Class 8 order volume is “about as bad as we expected” given that July again is a seasonally weak month for truck orders, with the market giving no reason to believe orders as trucking conditions remain poor or continue to deteriorate. On the medium-duty side, that analyst is now lowering its production forecast due to a string of sluggish order months, “Given three consecutive year-over-year declines in orders and some creep up in inventory levels, we are lowering our outlook for medium duty production [for] 2016 slightly to reflect flat production, down from our prior estimate of a low-single digit increase,” he said. In terms of expected annual Class 8 production levels down the road, he is projecting a total of 230,000 Class 8 units for this year, down 29% from 2015, falling further in 2017 to 205,000 units (down 11% from 2016), before reaching 200,000 units in 2018 (down 2% from 2017’s estimates). Other analysts offer a more robust Class 8 production picture, especially for 2018, with projections of about 236,000 units this year and 214,000 units in 2017, before a big spike back to 261,000 units in 2018.

Transport Topics / August 3, 2016 Cab-related products and systems supplier Commercial Vehicle Group Inc. announced that it would close three U.S. facilities in the Midwest beginning in the third quarter of the year in connection with a cost-reduction and restructuring plan it announced in 2015. The affected facilities include plants located in Monona, Iowa, and Shadyside, Ohio, along with administrative offices in Wixom, Michigan, according to the company. It said it will close its administrative office in Wixom when the lease expires in the third quarter of this year, as an outcome of its ongoing efforts to consolidate engineering services. The company said the Monona facility manufactures wire harnesses and has about 146 employees and the work will be transferred to the its operations in Agua Prieta, Mexico. A small group of administrative and sales professionals will remain in the Iowa market following the closure of the Monona facility, which is expected to be substantially completed by March 31, 2017, according to the company. The Shadyside facility performs assembly and stamping activities and has about 172 employees and the activities there will be transferred to alternative facilities or sourced to local suppliers, CVG said. The closure of the Shadyside facility is expected to be substantially completed by June 30, 2017, it said. The company said it plans to petition for assistance for eligible employees under the Department of Labor Trade Adjustment Assistance Program. “Decisions regarding facility closures are extremely difficult, but ultimately this restructuring plan reflects our ongoing efforts to align our manufacturing footprint with our customers and supply base in response to changing global macroeconomic conditions and the state of our end markets,” said Joseph Saoud, president of global construction, agriculture and military markets, said in a statement. He added, “Our employees are important to us and we will provide support for impacted personnel, however we must strategically manage our overhead and competitive cost position in response to market conditions and customer expectations.” “We understand the impact this decision will have on our employees and the communities of Monona and Shadyside where we have served as a long-time employer. Ultimately, we made the best decision we could to maximize our global capacity utilization in response to changing customer needs,” Dale McKillop, managing director of trim and structures, said in a statement. "We will provide assistance to our employees, including severance benefits, and hope that many of them will consider opportunities with CVG in other markets," added McKillop. The announcement follows one in May that reported pending negotiations with the hourly employees' union representative, to consolidate its North American seat production into two North American facilities and cease seat production in its Piedmont, Alabama facility [because that plant’s workers voted to join the UAW....see link below]. In February, the company said it began construction of a new wire harness facility in Agua Prieta. "This facility will allow us to expand and enhance our capabilities for the construction, agriculture and specialty vehicle markets." Related reading - http://www.bigmacktrucks.com/topic/41944-bostrom-seating-plant-workers-join-uaw/#comment-305107 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CVG produces all the Mack cabs, and has over the years purchased several well known component brands including Bostrom and National seating, Sprague and Moto Mirror. http://cvgrp.com/ It's up in the air as to whether CVG will produce the new cab. Connecting the dots of Mack conventional cab supplier history, Sheller-Globe purchased Motor Panels of the UK and then put the Norwalk Mack cab plant under its new Motor Panels division. Then that division was sold in 1989 to UK-based CH Industrials, which was sold in 1991 to UK-based Mayflower Vehicle Systems, which was sold in 2005 to CVG. The company had no prior history of assembling cabs, but was willing to do so. Currently, CVG stamps and assembles the cabs under contract in a run-down plant in Kings Mountain, North Carolina (originally located there to supply Mack Trucks' Winnsboro, South Carolina plant 70 miles away), from which they are trucked up 470 miles to Macungie.

Tehran’s F-14s Tomcats David Axe / September 8, 2015 On April 9, 1972, Iraq and the Soviet Union signed an historic agreement. The USSR committed to arming the Arab republic with the latest weaponry. In return for sending Baghdad guns, tanks and jet fighters, Moscow got just one thing, influence … in a region that held most of the world’s accessible oil. In neighboring Iran, news of Iraq’s alliance with the Soviets exploded like a bomb. Ethnically Persian and predominately Shia, Iran was, and still is, a bitter rival of Iraq’s Sunni Arab establishment, which during the 1970s dominated the country’s politics. In Tehran, King Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (the “shah”) moved quickly to counter Baghdad’s move. First he set loose an army of secret police in a desperate and bloody bid to quell internal dissent. And then he reached out to the United States. The shah wanted weapons. And not just any weapons. Himself a former military pilot, the king wanted the latest and best U.S.-made warplanes, with which the Iranian air force might dominate the Persian Gulf and even patrol as far away as the Indian Ocean. The Iranian leader’s appetite for planes was notorious. “He’ll buy anything that flies,” one American official said of the shah. But Pahlavi was especially keen to acquire a fighter that could fly fast enough and shoot far enough to confront Soviet MiG-25 Foxbat recon planes that had been flying over Iran at 60,000 feet and Mach 3. The Nixon administration was all too eager to grant the shah’s wish in exchange for Iran’s help balancing a rising Soviet Union. Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger visited Tehran in May 1972, and promptly offered the shah a “blank check.” Any weapons the king wanted and could pay for, he would get, regardless of the Pentagon’s own reservations and the State Department’s stringent export policies. That’s how, starting in the mid-1970s, Iran became the only country besides the United States to operate arguably the most powerful interceptor jet ever built, the Long Island-built Grumman F-14 Tomcat, a swing-wing carrier fighter packing a sophisticated radar and long-range AIM-54 Phoenix air-to-air missiles. It’s fair to say American policymakers quickly regretted giving Iran the F-14s. In February 1979, Islamic hardliners rose up against the shah’s police state, kidnapping 52 Americans at the U.S. embassy in Tehran and ushering the return of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The Islamic Revolution transformed Iran from an American ally to an enemy possessing 79 of the world’s most feared fighters. For the next five decades, the United States would do everything in its power, short of war, to ground the ayatollah’s F-14 “Tomcats”. But it failed. Through a combination of engineering ingenuity and audacious espionage, Iran kept its F-14s in working order, and even improved them. The swing-wing fighters took to the air in several conflicts and even occasionally confronted American planes. Today, Iran’s 40 or so surviving F-14s remain some of the best fighters in the Middle East. And since the U.S. Navy retired its last Tomcats in 2006, the ayatollah’s Tomcats are the only active Tomcats left in the world. The F-14 was a product of failure. In the 1960s, the Pentagon hoped to replace thousands of fighters in the U.S. Air Force and Navy with a single design capable of ground attack and air-to-air combat. The result was the General Dynamics F-111 — a two-person, twin-engine marvel of high technology that, in time, became an excellent long-range bomber in Air Force service. But as a naval fighter, the F-111 was a disaster. Complex, underpowered and difficult to maintain, the Navy’s F-111B version, which General Dynamics built in cooperation with carrier-fighter specialist Grumman, was also a widowmaker. Of the seven F-111B prototypes that the consortium built starting in 1964, three crashed. In 1968, the Defense Department halted work on the F-111B. Scrambling for a replacement, Grumman took the swing-wing concept, TF-30 engines, AWG-9 radar and long-range AIM-54 missile from the F-111B design and packed them into a smaller, lighter, simpler airframe. The result was the F-14 “Tomcat”. The first prototype took off on its inaugural flight in December 1970. The U.S. fleet got its first Tomcats two years later. Grumman ultimately built 712 F-14s. In 1974, the shah ordered 80 of the fighters plus spare parts and 284 Phoenix missiles at a cost of $2 billion. Seventy-nine of the Tomcats arrived before the Islamic Revolution forced the shah into exile in Egypt and compelled the United States to impose an arms embargo. The U.S. Navy eventually scooped up the 80th plane for one of its test squadrons. The U.S. State Department oversaw the F-14 transfer and, in its eternal wisdom, delegated most of the work to the Air Force. But the F-14 was a Navy plane and only the Navy had pilots qualified to fly the machine. The Navy seconded Tomcat crews to the Air Force, but only after extensive security checks lasting six months — and not without some culture clash. The Navy pilots picked up the brand-new Tomcats at the Grumman factory in Long Island, New York and flew them three at a time to Iran. “Few pilots in their careers ever have the opportunity to fly an airplane that ‘smells’ exactly as a new car, and still has cellophane covering the cushions of the ejection seat,” one F-14 flier wrote years later. “Well, I had that amazing experience.” “Although my F-14 was ‘factory fresh,’ it had an Iranian specified camouflage paint scheme. And while it did have U.S. military markings, as I found out later, those markings would be ingeniously and quickly changed upon arrival in Iran. The U.S. paint easily disappeared when a certain solution was applied, thus exposing the Iranian air force markings underneath.” The journey to Iran involved two legs, from Long Island to Torrejon, Spain, and then onward to Iran’s Isfahan air base, with Air Force KC-135 aerial tankers constantly attending to the F-14s. It was a complex and, for the pilots, uncomfortable undertaking. “We needed to be ‘topped-off’ with fuel for most of the seven-hour flight in case we had to divert to an emergency field,” the ferry pilot wrote. “This meant at least six in-flight refueling events for each leg, despite some weather conditions, and the KC-135’s difficult, Rube Goldberg type of refueling hose to accommodate Navy aircraft.” Air Force planes refuel in mid-air via a probe extending from the tanker into the receiving plane’s fuselage, the tanker crew does most of the work. Navy aircraft have their own probes and refuel by maneuvering the probe into a basket dangling from the tanker’s underwing fuel pods. The receiving pilot does the work, an arrangement consistent with the incredibly high demands the Navy traditionally places on its combat pilots. To make the KC-135s compatible with the F-14s, the Air Force awkwardly fitted a basket to the tankers’ probes. The improvised contraption tended to whip around in the air, threatening to smash the Tomcats’ canopies every time they refueled. Keeping gassed up wasn’t the only source of stress for the Tomcat ferry crews. “People often wonder, and it is rarely discussed, how did you relieve yourself, strapped into an ejection seat and immobile for seven-plus hours?” the pilot wrote. The Navy offered the fliers diapers, but some refused to wear them. “I personally held it for seven hours … as I had planned and for which I had prepared by remaining dehydrated. Hey, I’m a fighter pilot.” “However, upon arrival in Torrejon, I could barely salute the welcoming Air Force colonel,” the pilot continued. “Bending over and doubled-up under pressure, I feverishly ran to the nearest ‘head’ to relieve myself for seemingly and refreshingly forever, before I could then return to properly meet, greet and properly salute the receiving Air Force colonel.” While the U.S. Air Force and Navy worked together to deliver Iran’s F-14s, the State Department arranged for Iranian aviators and maintenance technicians to get training on the Tomcats and their complex systems. Some of the Iranians attended classes in the United States, others received instruction from American contractors in Iran. By 1979, the Americans had trained 120 pilots and backseat radar intercept officers. The shah’s Tomcat squadrons were coming to life. But the Iranian king wasn’t entirely happy with his acquisition. In late 1975, the shah complained to the U.S. embassy in Tehran that Grumman had paid agents in Iran $24 million to facilitate the F-14 sale. The shah considered the payments bribes — and wanted Grumman to take the money back. “Shah views with bitter scorn corrupt practices of agents for U.S. companies and ineffective [U.S. government] efforts to deal with problem,” the embassy reported back to Washington in January 1976. The shah was so angry that he threatened to halt payments to Grumman. Washington reminded Tehran that failure to pay would amount to breach of contract. “The dispute over agents fees was poisoning U.S.-Iranian relations,” American diplomats in Tehran warned. Amid the diplomatic tension, Tehran put its Tomcats to good use performing the mission for which Iran originally wanted them — deterring the Soviet Union’s MiG-25 spy planes. In August 1977, Iranian F-14 crews shot down a BQM-34E target drone flying at 50,000 feet. “The Soviets took the hint and Foxbat over flights promptly ended,” Iranian air force major Farhad Nassirkhani wrote. Tehran’s spat with Grumman continued, but a year and a half later the Islamic Revolution intervened and rendered the issue moot. On January 16, 1979, the shah fled Iran. Twenty-seven of Iran’s freshly-minted F-14 fliers fled, too. On their own way out of the country, American technicians working for Hughes, the company that manufactured the Phoenix missile, sabotaged 16 of the deadly missiles, or tried to, at least. Engineers eventually repaired the damaged munitions. Agents of Iran’s new Islamic regime suspected the remaining F-14 crews of harboring pro-shah and pro-American sentiments. Police arrested at least one F-14 pilot at gunpoint at his home, finally releasing him months later when the regime realized it actually needed trained aircrews if it ever hoped to make use of all those brand-new F-14s lined up on the tarmac at Khatami air base. By September 1980, Iran and Iraq were at war. Baghdad’s own MiG-25 fighters and recon planes could dash into Iranian air space unmolested by Tehran’s much slower and lower-flying F-4 and F-5 fighters. Over the course of the eight-year war, MiG-25s shot down more than a dozen Iranian aircraft, including a priceless EC-130 electronic warfare plane. Iraqi pilot Col. Mohommed Rayyan alone claimed eight kills in his MiG-25. Only the F-14 could challenge the MiG-25. When war broke out, just 77 Tomcats were left — two had crashed. With crews and maintainers scattered and Tehran cut off from Grumman, Hughes and the U.S. Air Force and Navy, most of the Iranian F-14s were inoperable. The ayatollah’s air force managed to assemble 60 loyal pilots and 24 back-seat radar operators. By stripping parts from grounded Tomcats, technicians were able to get a dozen F-14s in fighting shape. At first, the Tomcats acted as early-warning and battle-management platforms while less sophisticated planes did the actual fighting. “The planes have not been used in combat,” The New York Times reported in December 1981. “Rather they have stood off from the battle and been used as control aircraft, with their advanced radar and electronics guiding other planes to their targets or warning the pilots of Iraqi aircraft attacks.” The fighting escalated and drew the F-14s into battle. In eight years of combat, Iran’s Tomcat crews claimed some 200 aerial victories against Iraqi planes, 64 of which the Iranian air force was able to confirm. One F-14 pilot named Jalil Zandi reportedly claimed a staggering 11 air-to-air victories, making him by far Iran’s deadliest fighter pilot of the war. “The Iraqi high command had ordered all its pilots not to engage with F-14 and do not get close if [an] F-14 is known to be operating in the area,” Nassirkhani wrote. “Usually the presence of Tomcats was enough to scare the enemy and send the Iraqi fighters back.” At first, the F-14s were armed only with their internal 20-millimeter cannons and the long-range Phoenix missiles. American contractors had not had time to integrate medium-range Sparrow and short-range Sidewinder missiles. Normal tactics called for F-14 crews to fire Phoenixes at their targets from a hundred miles away or farther, but with no alternative armament Iranian aviators relied on the heavy AIM-54s for close-in fighting, as well, once even hitting an Iraqi plane from just 12 miles away, according to Iranian reporter Babak Taghvaee. Eight F-14s fell in combat during the war with Iraq, one accidentally shot down by an Iranian F-4; three struck by Baghdad’s Mirage F.1 fighters; one hit by an Iraqi MiG-21; and two falling victim to unknown attackers. The eighth Tomcat that Tehran lost during the Iran-Iraq war reportedly wound up in Iraq when its crew defected. Taghvaee claimed that U.S. Special Operations Forces infiltrated “deep inside Iraqi territory” in order to destroy the abandoned F-14 and “prevent it falling into Soviet hands.” Iranian Tomcats intercepted Iraqi MiG-25s on several occasions. But only one Iranian flier succeeded in downing any of the Mach-3 MiGs. In September 1982 and again in December, Shahram Rostani struck MiG-25s with Phoenix missiles. Combat ops were hard on Iran’s F-14 force. A lack of spare parts compounded the maintenance woes. After the revolution, the United States had frozen Iranian assets, embargoed Iranian trade and imposed other economic sanctions. The United Nations and many U.S. allies followed suit, cutting off Tehran from global supply chains. In 1981 an Iranian trade agent wrote to the London office of F-14-builder Grumman asking to acquire parts for Iran’s Tomcats. Citing the new sanctions, Washington declined to grant Grumman a license to sell the components. “It is the present policy of the United States government not to permit Grumman or any other defense contractor to obtain a license to provide Iran with these materials,” the Navy told The New York Times. By 1984, just 15 or so of the twin-engine fighters were flightworthy, according to Nassirkhani. Technicians kept the 15 jets in good repair mainly by taking parts from the roughly 50 F-14s that couldn’t fly. Starting in 1981, Iranian Aircraft Industries began performing overhauls and upgrades on the F-14s as part of the Tehran’s effort to make the country militarily self-sufficient. The upgrades finally added Sparrow and Sidewinder missiles to the Tomcats. The self-sufficiency program had help from Iranian agents working abroad — and at great risk to themselves — to divert spare parts for the F-14s and other weapon systems. America begrudgingly helped, too — albeit briefly. In negotiating to free American hostages that an Iran-backed militant group was holding in Lebanon, the Reagan administration agreed to transfer to Tehran badly-needed military equipment including Phoenix missiles and bomb racks. Iranian engineers added the bomb racks to four of the F-14s as early as 1985, transforming the Tomcats into heavy ground-attack planes. Years later, the U.S. Navy would modify its own F-14s in the same way. Rostani flew the “Bombcat’s” first ground-attack mission in 1985, targeting an Iraqi field headquarters … but missing. Frustrated technicians boosted the Bombcat’s weapons load-out with a whopping, custom-made 7,000-pound bomb, one of the biggest freefall munitions ever. As Iranian commander-in-chief Gen. Abbas Babaei observed from near the front line, an F-14 lobbed the massive bomb. The estimated time on target passed … but nothing happened. Babaei was getting ready to return to his jeep when a powerful blast shook the ground. The bomb had missed, but its psychological effect on Iraqi troops was surely profound. By the war’s end in 1988, 34 of the 68 surviving F-14s were airworthy. But just two of the Persian Tomcats had working radars. And Iran had expended all of its original consignment of Phoenixes. More Phoenixes arrived as part of the hostages-for-arms deal with the United States, and in the post-war years Iranian Aircraft Industries experimented with “new” weaponry for the F-14 — including modified Hawk surface-to-air missiles that the shah had bought from the United States as well as Soviet-supplied R-73 missiles. The experiments added flexibility to the F-14 force, but it was the spare parts that kept the Tomcats in working condition, and the Iranian air force quickly burned through the spares it obtained from the hostage deal. Tehran established self-sufficiency programs, not just in the air force, but across the nation’s economy, in an effort to satisfy material needs that foreign companies had once met. But Iranian companies struggled to produce all the specialized parts that the Tomcat requires. In the late 1990s, the air force considered simply buying new planes to replace the F-14s, but China was the only country that would sell fighters to Iran. In 1997 and 1998, Iranian pilots evaluated China’s F-8 … and rejected it. Even deprived of spares and mostly grounded, the F-14s were superior to the Chinese planes in the eyes of Iran’s air force. Tehran turned to the black market, paying huge sums to shady middlemen to sneak F-14 parts into Iran. American authorities became aware of the illicit trade as early as 1998. In March that year, federal agents arrested Iranian-born Parviz Lavi at his home in Long Island, charging him with violating U.S. export law by attempting to buy up spare parts for the F-14’s TF-30 engine and ship them to Iran via The Netherlands. Lavi got five years in prison plus a $125,000 fine. The arrests came in a steady drumbeat. In 1998, an aircraft parts vendor in San Diego told U.S. customs officials that Multicore Ltd. in California had requested price information for air intake seals used only on the F-14. Agents arrested Multicore’s Saeed Homayouni, a naturalized Canadian from Iran, and Yew Leng Fung, a Malaysian citizen. “Bank records subpoenaed by the Customs Service showed that Multicore Ltd. had made 399 payments totaling $2.26 million to military parts brokers since 1995 and had received deposits of $2.21 million,” The Washington Post reported. The company shipped parts mostly through Singapore. The feds began investigating 18 companies that had supplied airplane components to Multicore. In September 2003, U.S. authorities arrested Iranian Serzhik Avasappian in a South Florida hotel as part of a sting operation. Agents had shown Avasappian several F-14 parts worth $800,000 and arrested him after he offered to buy the components. “While these components may appear relatively innocuous to the untrained eye, they are tightly controlled for good reason,” said Immigration and Customs Enforcement interim agent Jesus Torres. “In the wrong hands, they pose a potential threat to Americans at home and abroad.” Even with U.S. authorities tamping down on the illicit trade in F-14 parts, Iran persisted. After shutting down Multicore, the feds confiscated the firm’s Tomcat components and sent them to the Defense Department’s surplus-parts office. In 2005, a company, allegedly Iranian, bought the very same parts from the military. The parts war escalated after the U.S. Navy retired its last F-14s in 2006, leaving Iran as the type’s only operator. In 2007, U.S. agents even seized four intact ex-U.S. Navy F-14s in California, three at museums and one belonging to a producer on the military-themed T.V. show JAG, charging that the F-14s had not been properly stripped of useful parts that could wind up in Iranian hands. The U.S. Congress was furious at the Pentagon for its lax handling of the F-14-parts problem. Rep. Christopher Shays, a Connecticut Republican, described it as “a huge breakdown, an absolute, huge breakdown.” Lawmakers passed a bill specifically banning any trade in Tomcat components to Iran or any other entity, and then-president George W. Bush signed the law in 2008. A tragedy unfolded as the military paid contractors to dismantle, crush and shred many of the approximately 150 retired F-14s. Scores of old F-14s, properly “demilitarized”, are still on display in museums across the United States. But none remain at the famous airplane “boneyard” in Arizona, where the Pentagon stores retired planes just in case it needs them again. Even so, the underground trade in Tomcat parts continues, with shady companies scouring the planet for leftover components. In early 2014, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security investigated Israeli arms dealers that it said had twice tried to send F-14 spares to Iran. Tomcats have led the effort to intercept American RQ-170 stealth reconnaissance drones. In the early 2000s, Iranian F-14 crews reported seeing increasingly sophisticated and bizarre drones. The CIA’s intelligence drones displayed astonishing hypersonic space-capable flight characteristics, including an ability to fly outside the atmosphere, attain a maximum cruise speed of Mach 10 and a minimum speed of zero, with the ability to hover over the target. And, the drones used powerful [electronic countermeasures] that could jam enemy radars using very high levels of magnetic energy. In November 2004, one F-14 crew intercepted a suspected CIA drone. As the aviators tried to lock onto the drone with their Tomcat’s AWG-9 radar, they “saw that the radar scope was disrupted. The drone lit its green afterburner and escaped. Whether it’s producing parts itself or acquiring them abroad, Iran is clearly succeeding in its efforts to supply its trusted 40-year-old F-14s. In October 2013, over 40 of Tehran’s surviving F-14s were estimated to be in flyable condition, possibly the highest number since the mid-1970s. Iran has begun upgrading the Tomcats with new radar components, radios, navigation systems and wiring while also adding compatibility with R-73 and Hawk missiles. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Wikipedia Beginning in the late 1950s, the U.S. Navy sought a long-range, high-endurance interceptor to defend its carrier battle groups against long-range anti-ship missiles launched from the jet bombers and submarines of the Soviet Union. The U.S. Navy needed a Fleet Air Defense (FAD) aircraft with a more powerful radar, and longer range missiles than the F-4 Phantom II to intercept both enemy bombers and missiles. The Navy was directed to participate in the Tactical Fighter Experimental (TFX) program with the U.S. Air Force by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. McNamara wanted "joint" solutions to service aircraft needs to reduce development costs, and had already directed the Air Force to buy the F-4 Phantom II, which was developed for the Navy and Marine Corps. The Navy strenuously opposed the TFX as it feared compromises necessary for the Air Force's need for a low-level attack aircraft would adversely impact the aircraft's performance as a fighter. Weight and performance issues plagued the U.S. Navy F-111B variant for TFX and would not be resolved to the Navy's satisfaction. The F-111 manufacturer General Dynamics partnered with Grumman on the Navy F-111B. With the F-111B program in distress, Grumman began studying improvements and alternatives. In 1966, the Navy awarded Grumman a contract to begin studying advanced fighter designs. Grumman narrowed down these designs to its 303 design. Vice Admiral Thomas F. Connolly, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air Warfare, took the developmental F-111A variant for a flight and discovered that it had difficulty going supersonic and had poor carrier landing characteristics. He later testified to Congress about his concerns against the official Department of the Navy position and, in May 1968, Congress stopped funding for the F-111B, allowing the Navy to pursue an answer tailored to its requirements. The name "Tomcat" was partially chosen to pay tribute to Admiral Connolly, as the nickname "Tom's Cat" had already been widely used by the manufacturer, although the name also followed the Grumman tradition of naming its fighter aircraft after felines. The F-111B had been designed for the long-range Fleet Air Defense (FAD) interceptor role, but not for new requirements for air combat based on experience of American aircraft against agile MiG fighters over Vietnam. The Navy studied the need for VFAX, an additional fighter that was more agile than the F-4 Phantom for air-combat and ground-attack roles. Grumman continued work on its 303 design and offered it to the Navy in 1967, which led to fighter studies by the Navy. The company continued to refine the design into 1968. In July 1968, the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) issued a request for proposals (RFP) for the Naval Fighter Experimental (VFX) program. VFX called for a tandem two-seat, twin-engined air-to-air fighter with a maximum speed of Mach 2.2. It would also have a built-in M61 Vulcan cannon and a secondary close air support role. The VFX's air-to-air missiles would be either six AIM-54 Phoenix or a combination of six AIM-7 Sparrow and four AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles. Bids were received from General Dynamics, Grumman, Ling-Temco-Vought, McDonnell Douglas and North American Rockwell;[11] four bids incorporated variable-geometry wings. McDonnell Douglas and Grumman were selected as finalists in December 1968. Grumman was selected for the contract award in January 1969. Grumman's design reused the TF30 engines from the F-111B, though the Navy planned on replacing them with the Pratt & Whitney F401-400 engines under development for the Navy, along with the related Pratt & Whitney F100 for the USAF. Though lighter than the F-111B, it was still the largest and heaviest U.S. fighter to fly from an aircraft carrier, a consequence of the requirement to carry the large AWG-9 radar and AIM-54 Phoenix missiles (from the F-111B) and an internal fuel load of 16,000 lb (7,300 kg). Upon winning the contract for the F-14, Grumman greatly expanded its Calverton, Long Island, New York facility for evaluating the aircraft. Much of the testing, including the first of many compressor stalls and multiple ejections, took place over Long Island Sound. In order to save time and forestall interference from Secretary McNamara, the Navy skipped the prototype phase and jumped directly to full-scale development; the Air Force took a similar approach with its F-15. The F-14 first flew on 21 December 1970, just 22 months after Grumman was awarded the contract, and reached initial operational capability (IOC) in 1973. The United States Marine Corps was initially interested in the F-14 as an F-4 Phantom II replacement; going so far as to send officers to Fighter Squadron One Twenty-Four (VF-124) to train as instructors. The Marine Corps pulled out of any procurement when development of the stores management system for ground attack munitions was not pursued. An air-to-ground capability was not developed until the 1990s. Operational History - Iran The sole foreign customer for the F-14 Tomcat was the Imperial Iranian Air Force, during the reign of the last Shah (King) of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. In the early 1970s, the Imperial Iranian Air Force (IIAF) was searching for an advanced fighter, specifically one capable of intercepting Soviet MiG-25 reconnaissance flights. After a visit of U.S. President Richard Nixon to Iran in 1972, during which Iran was offered the latest in American military technology, the IIAF narrowed its choice between the F-14 Tomcat or the McDonnell Douglas F-15 Eagle. Grumman Corporation arranged a competitive demonstration of the Eagle against the Tomcat before the Shah, and in January 1974, Iran ordered 30 F-14s and 424 AIM-54 Phoenix missiles, initiating Project Persian King, worth US$300 million. A few months later, this order was increased to a total of 80 Tomcats and 714 Phoenix missiles as well as spare parts and replacement engines for 10 years, complete armament package, and support infrastructure (including construction of the Khatami Air Base near Esfahan). The first F-14 arrived in January 1976, modified only by the removal of classified avionics components, but fitted with the TF-30-414 engines. The following year 12 more were delivered. Meanwhile, training of the first groups of Iranian crews by the U.S. Navy, was underway in the USA; and one of these conducted a successful shoot-down with a Phoenix missile of a target drone flying at 50,000 ft (15 km). Following the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, the air force was renamed the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force (IRIAF) and the post-revolution interim government of Iran canceled most Western arms orders. In 1980, an Iranian F-14 shot down an Iraqi Mil Mi-25 helicopter for its first air-to-air kill during the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988). According to research by Tom Cooper, Iranian F-14s scored at least 50 air-to-air victories in the first six months of the war against Iraqi MiG-21s, MiG-23s, and some Su-20s/22s. During the same time period, only one Iranian F-14 suffered damage after being hit by an nearby MiG-21 when it exploded. Iranian Tomcats were originally used as an early-warning platform assisting other less-sophisticated aircraft with targeting and defense. They were also crucial to the defense of areas deemed vital by Iranian regime and infrastructure, such as Tehran and Kharg Island. Many of these patrols had the support of Boeing 707-3J9C in-flight refueling tankers. As fighting escalated between 1982 and 1986, however, the F-14s gradually became more involved in battle. They performed well, but their primary role was to intimidate the Iraqi Air Force and avoid heavy engagement to protect the fleet's numbers. Their presence was often enough to drive away opposing Iraqi fighters. The precision and effectiveness of the Tomcat's AWG-9 weapons system and AIM-54A Phoenix long-range air-to-air missiles enabled the F-14 to maintain air superiority. By 1987, the Iraqis had suffered heavy losses and were forced to find a solution to level the battle field. They obtained Mirage F.1EQ-6 fighters from France in 1988, armed with Super530D and Magic Mk.2 air-to-air missiles. The Mirage F.1 fighters were eventually responsible for three confirmed F-14 kills. The IRIAF attempted to keep 60 F-14s operational throughout the war, but reports indicate this number was reduced to 30 by 1986 with only half fully mission-capable. Overall, Cooper states that Iranian F-14s shot down at least 160 Iraqi aircraft during the Iran–Iraq War, which includes 58 MiG-23s, 33 Mirage F1s, 23 MiG-21s, 23 Su-20s/22s, nine MiG-25s, five Tu-22s, two MiG-27s, one Mil Mi-24, one Dassault Mirage 5, one B-6D, one Aérospatiale Super Frelon, and two unidentified aircraft. Despite the circumstances the F-14s and their crews faced during the war against Iraq – lacking support from AWACS, AEW aircraft, and Ground Control Intercept (GCI) – the F-14 proved to be successful in combat. It achieved this in the midst of a confrontation with an enemy that was constantly upgrading its capabilities and receiving support from three major countries – France, the USA, and the USSR. While Iraq's army claimed it shot down more than 70 F-14s, the Foreign Broadcast Information System in Washington DC estimated that Iran lost 12 to 16 during the war. Cooper writes only three F-14 were shot down by Iraqis and four others by Iranian SAM Missiles. Two Tomcats were lost in unknown circumstances during the battle, and as many as seven crashed due to technical failure or accidents. On 31 August 1986, an Iranian F-14A armed with at least one AIM-54A missile defected to Iraq. In addition, one or more of Iran's F-14A was delivered to the Soviet Union in exchange for technical assistance; at least one of its crew defected to the Soviet Union. Iran had an estimated 44 F-14s in 2009 according to Combat Aircraft.Aviation Week estimated it had 19 operational F-14s in January 2013, and Flight Global estimated that 28 were in service in 2014. In January 2007, the U.S. Department of Defense announced that sales of spare F-14 parts would be suspended over concerns of the parts ending up in Iran. In July 2007, the remaining American F-14s were shredded to ensure that any parts could not be acquired. In summer of 2010, Iran requested that the United States deliver the 80th F-14 it had purchased in 1974. In October 2010, an Iranian Air Force commander claimed that the country overhauls and optimizes different types of military aircraft, mentioning that Air Force has even installed Iran-made radar systems on the F-14. On 26 January 2012, an Iranian F-14 crashed three minutes after takeoff. Both crew members were killed. In November 2015, Iranian F-14s had been reported flying escort for Russian Tu-95 bombers on air strikes in Syria against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. .

I bet those boys would have an unforgettable vacation at the beach. http://www.cntraveler.com/galleries/2015-05-22/best-beaches-in-the-us/1

Car & Driver / August 2016 Gas prices have dipped nearly 50 cents per gallon in a year, providing suburban cowboys with a guilt-free opportunity to scratch that off-road itch. Enter GMC with a well-timed All Terrain X package for the Sierra 1500. The truck reviewed here is a two-step march up from the base $48,465 Sierra 1500 4WD Crew Cab SLT, which lives just below the Sierra Denali in GMC’s pecking order. The $2105 All Terrain package contains a mix of hard- and soft-core upgrades: an off-road suspension with Rancho shocks, a locking rear differential, an 8-speed automatic transmission, 18-inch wheels, body-color bumpers, a spray-on bedliner, Bose audio, heated leather seats, and a center console with wireless charging. The $4315 X package—available on Sierra SLT 4x4s in the crew-cab, short-box body style as well as double-cab, standard-box form—kicks in additional macho gear: Goodyear Wrangler DuraTrac on-/off-road tires, black-finished wheels and mirrors, LED headlamps and taillamps, side steps, a performance exhaust system that adds 10 horsepower for a total of 365 hp, and a full set of rubber floor mats. A bed-mounted sport bar touts your Sierra Club membership in mega-red letters. Add a few more upgrades—a $995 power sunroof, GMC’s $495 Intellilink infotainment system with navigation, and a $275 trailer-brake controller—and you’ll match our truck’s $56,695 window sticker. For reference, that tops a BMW M2’s base price by exactly $4000. This king’s ransom buys surprising versatility. The stiffer suspension doesn’t beat you to death when you drive on pavement, the standard 5.3-liter V-8 is all but silent at work, and the eight-speed automatic transmission—introduced for 2015 and now available with the smaller Sierra V-8—shuffles gears with the skill of a Vegas blackjack dealer. This transmission offers trailer-tow and manual shift modes, allowing you to hold your selected ratio up to the engine’s fuel cutoff. The refinement GMC has put into this truck is what makes it popular with well-heeled customers seeking a pickup with a wide range of on-road, off-road, hauling, and towing capabilities. Casual shoppers, though, must be cautioned. This is a huge truck, and its 12-foot wheelbase and 47-foot turning circle mean it takes planning and practice to enter a standard parking spot. Every trip to the driver’s seat is a two-step climb, and the 35-inch-high tailgate is annoyingly high for performing normal truck tasks such as loading dirt bikes, home-improvement materials, and lawn fertilizer. During our 1000-mile drive, which involved minimal hauling and off-roading and no towing, we averaged 19 mpg. That’s respectable for a buff 5688-pound vehicle. One quirk is that lighter, less luxurious Sierra 4x4s equipped with GMC’s six-speed automatic transmission outscore the eight-speed’s 15/21 mpg city/highway EPA ratings by 1 mpg each. While our Sierra’s 19-mpg observed fuel economy beat two Ford F-150 pickups we recently tested by 3 mpg, this GMC fell behind in practically every other test. The run to 60 mph in 6.6 seconds is 0.3 second slower than the 385-hp F-150 V-8 and 0.8 second slower than the 375-hp EcoBoost V-6. (Who wouldn’t trade .3 seconds of 0-60 time for 3 mpg of improved fuel economy? Note: the 6.2L is only rated 1 mpg less) Chalk that up to the Fords’ aluminum cab and bed construction, which gives them a 255-to-468-pound weight advantage. (The GMC earns partial credit for its aluminum hood.) The Sierra’s off-road rubber hurt it in traction tests, where it needed more than 200 feet to stop from 70 mph (versus 179 to 187 feet for previous four-by-four GMCs without the off-road kit and tires). It also scored only 0.70 g of lateral adhesion on the skidpad, versus the F-150 V-8’s 0.75 g and the 0.77 g that its GMC siblings managed. The GMC’s highway cruising noise level is four decibels higher than the Ford’s and two decibels louder than with ordinary all-season tires. That’s the price you pay for driving on treads molded to dig into mud and dirt. Fortunately, there is compensation for these performance shortcomings. This Sierra is a handsome piece, with minimal chrome disrupting its black exterior theme. The 3.5-inch-high GMC letters in the black chrome grille are quite effective at brushing left-lane laggards out of the way. The X package’s few flashy bits live discreetly in the LED lamps, lug nuts, and Sierra All Terrain badges. One flight of fancy is the double-tube bed adornment, a visual throwback to the Chevrolet Avalanche and the Cadillac Escalade EXT. Any potential rollover protection is squandered by securing this aluminum arch atop the bed flanks with just a few fasteners. This sport bar’s main purpose is to look cool while carrying the CHMSL and a pair of LED jacklights. Before you plan your attack on the Rubicon, be advised that the All Terrain label is hyperbole. This truck is too wide to slip between trees and boulders. There are guard plates under the engine and transfer case, but the fuel tank, front air dam, spare tire, and side steps are vulnerable to attack from the dark side. This Sierra should confidently handle trails and year-round slippery conditions, but those serious about taking the fight to Mother Nature will need a lift kit, taller tires, and additional underbody protection. Inside, this high Sierra is a model of impeccable taste. The three-adults-wide back seat, a vanishing attribute in the car world, lives here in comfortable splendor. Lifting the split bottom cushions opens space to secure camping gear, beverage coolers, and sporting equipment galore. The red-stitched leather seat trim has side bolsters accented with a convincing use of woven carbon fiber. The ignition still requires a key, but the cabin is otherwise well stocked with contemporary features. The front seats are heated, and the pedals are adjustable. There are enough AC, DC, USB, and wireless-charging receptacles to dazzle an electrician. The center console and twin gloveboxes are commodious enough to support a mobile business. The 8.0-inch touchscreen is compatible with both Apple CarPlay and Android Auto (although at this writing, there’s a hold on this feature in some Sierra configurations, including this model, and a $200 credit for doing without). The bank of six analog instruments will impress classic-gauge fans, although a 140-mph speedometer in a vehicle governed at 98 mph seems silly. There’s a handy inclinometer in the driver’s cluster to report pitch, roll, and steering angles. One lapse is that the cab lacks high-level cooling vents for rear occupants. It’s no easy feat to charm buyers with a traditional pickup while the horde of crossovers offers creative solutions to transportation and hauling needs. But as long as Texas keeps pumping and fracking continues to suppress pump prices, pickup fans will keep coming back for GMCs that have a fresh face and a sense of adventure. Photo gallery - http://www.caranddriver.com/photo-gallery/2016-gmc-sierra-1500-4x4-all-terrain-x-instrumented-test

U.S. market Value-Liners all always had small "Mack" letters, part number 230SX2 (2" high).......versus 230SX1 (3" high).

Justice Department Officials Raised Objections on U.S. Cash Payment to Iran The Wall Street Journal / August 3, 2016 Some officials worried about message being sent but were overruled Senior Justice Department officials objected to sending a plane loaded with cash to Tehran at the same time that Iran released four imprisoned Americans, but their objections were overruled by the State Department. After announcing the release of the Americans in January, President Barack Obama also said the U.S. would pay $1.7 billion to Iran to settle a failed arms deal dating back to 1979. What wasn’t disclosed then was that the first payment would be $400 million in cash, flown in at the same time. The timing and manner of the payment raised alarms at the Justice Department. “People knew what it was going to look like, and there was concern the Iranians probably did consider it a ransom payment,’’ said a person familiar with the discussions. The disclosures reignited a political furor over the Iran deal in Washington that could complicate White House efforts to fortify it before Mr. Obama’s term ends. Three top Republicans who have been feuding in recent weeks—presidential candidate Donald Trump, Sen. John McCain and House Speaker Paul Ryan—were united Wednesday in blasting the Obama administration. Senior U.S. officials denied the payment was anything like a ransom. They disputed that there was any link between the payment and the prisoner exchange, saying there was no quid pro quo. White House press secretary Josh Earnest accused Republicans of seizing upon the Journal report to revive their campaign against the landmark nuclear deal, which took effect the same weekend as the prisoner release. The prisoner-swap negotiations were led by the State Department, with help from the CIA and FBI. The cash settlement talks were handled principally by State Department lawyers. All of that work was overseen, and ultimately approved, by the White House. A Justice Department spokesman said the agency “fully supported the ultimate outcome of the administration’s resolution of several issues with Iran,” including the settlement of the long-running case at a tribunal in The Hague, “as well as the return of U.S. citizens detained in Iran.” The Justice Department spokesman declined to comment further on what he termed “internal interagency deliberations.’’ A State Department spokesman declined to comment. [Your employees in Washington.......refuse to tell the American public what happened.] Justice Department officials didn’t object to the $1.7 billion settlement, which they viewed as a bargain given decades of inflation and the circumstances of the original deal, these people said. But their concerns show that even within the Obama administration there were worries that the pallets of cash could send the wrong signal to Iran—and potentially to others—about U.S. policy when it came to hostages. The U.S. has a longstanding policy of not paying ransom to hostage-takers. The issue has long been a difficult one for the Justice Department and the FBI, which was criticized last year for providing intelligence assistance to a U.S. family as it tried to buy the freedom of an American aid worker in Pakistan. As a result, the Obama administration issued new guidance on how to handle international hostage cases. The instructions didn’t represent a policy shift but were largely designed to foster better cooperation and coordination among the federal agencies involved. The Justice Department raised other objections to the Iran deals. Prosecutors were concerned that the U.S. would release too many Iranian convicts and drop too many pending criminal cases against people suspected of violating sanctions laws. They prevailed regarding some of the suspects—those accused or suspected of crimes of terrorism or other violence—but the objections on others were overruled, according to the people familiar with the discussions. The cash transfer and prisoner exchange coincided with the formal implementation that same weekend of the landmark nuclear agreement reached between Tehran, the U.S. and other global powers the summer before.

US-backed Syrian rebels responsible for toxic gas attack in Aleppo RT / August 3, 2016 Syrian fighters from a rebel group considered ‘moderate’ by Washington are responsible for using toxic gas-filled (chlorine) shells that killed seven and injured 23 in Aleppo on Tuesday, according to the Russian Ministry of Defense. On August 2, 2016 at 19 hours 05 minutes militants from the Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki group, considered by Washington as ‘moderate opposition’, launched poisonous materials from the Sukkari district towards the eastern part of Aleppo,” the ministry said. The ministry added that the territory is under rebel control and that shells were fired towards “the residential area” of the Salah-Eddin district. Moscow informed Washington of the use of toxic shells on Monday, Lieutenant-General Sergey Chvarkov, head of the Russian Reconciliation Center in Syria, said. On Tuesday evening, Syria’s state-run SANA news agency reported that Syrian officials said an attack using poisonous gas had occurred in Aleppo. A “terrorist attack” on the Old City of Aleppo with “shells containing toxic gas” led to the deaths of five and suffocation of eight more civilians, said city health director Mohamad Hazouri. Terrorist groups fired rocket shells at the al-Hamadaniyeh neighborhood, injuring six. They also targeted the Salah-Eddin neighborhood, killing two and injuring 11 more. “We’ve taken 12 injured people, six other patients have already died from suffocation. Our doctors were prepared to treat people showing symptoms of gas poisoning. We’ve been expecting terrorists to use weapons of this kind,” said an Aleppo hospital doctor. The gas in question was reportedly chlorine – a highly toxic substance that leads to breathing problems, a loss of consciousness, and illnesses among those exposed to it. The al-Zenki rebel group was in the spotlight in July after two videos appeared online showing its fighters taunting and then cutting off the head of a Palestinian boy. (http://www.bigmacktrucks.com/topic/41827-syria/?page=2) State Department spokesperson Mark Toner said it would look into the case and warned of ‘possible’ consequences for the rebels (http://www.bigmacktrucks.com/topic/41827-syria/?page=3). On Wednesday, Tone said the U.S. is still “looking into that incident.”. “One indeed can ask the United States why it still continues to support this group,” says Belgian journalist Willy Van Damme. He added that despite promises from Washington to look into the case, there has been “no reply” since. In a separate incident, Tuesday media reports suggested that toxic gas had been dispersed in an area in which a Russian helicopter had been shot down, in Syria’s Idlib province. The Kremlin said that it has no information on the issue adding that it’s not always clear what such claims are based on. The UN also said that it can’t confirm these reports, while Washington said that it is investigating the claims.