New Mack Logo

[chu613]

Please clarify the E-7 origin for me. I was under the impression that this engine was a Renault design. I personally saw a Mack Vision with an ASET engine in it having the Renault name on the engine block on the pass. side somewhere around the lower side of the block. I was born and raised in Europe and I've been driving trucks there for 9 years before I've emigrated to Canada. I drove almost any truck except one: Scania. Just did'n happened. When I first drove a Mack, that E-tech engine looked familiar to me specialy when you see the Mack-Renault name on what's I think is the fuel prime pump.

[kscarbel]

Please clarify the E-7 origin for me. I was under the impression that this engine was a Renault design. I personally saw a Mack Vision with an ASET engine in it having the Renault name on the engine block on the pass. side somewhere around the lower side of the block. I was born and raised in Europe and I've been driving trucks there for 9 years before I've emigrated to Canada. I drove almost any truck except one: Scania. Just did'n happened. When I first drove a Mack, that E-tech engine looked familiar to me specialy when you see the Mack-Renault name on what's I think is the fuel prime pump.

The E7 E-Tech is not a Renault design although the French truckmaker controlled Mack during its development. The E7 E-Tech is an E7 with unit pump injection. Renault's name was on the block because the E7 E-Tech also equipped Renault Magnum heavy trucks sold in Europe and the global market.

[chu613]

The E7 E-Tech not not a Renault design although the French truckmaker controlled Mack during its development. The E7 E-Tech is an E7 with unit pump injection. Renault's name was on the block because the E7 E-Tech also equipped Renault Magnum heavy trucks sold in Europe and the global market.

[chu613]

Got it. Thanks

[kscarbel]

Speaking of engine blocks, I’d like to share a little more background on that subject. Sadly, it is a story that highlights the decline of America’s industrial might and competitiveness, and the subsequent rise of foreign rivals.

From 1998 in the face of heated competition, Golden Casting Corporation was banking on its new coremaking technology to secure its long-term supply to the heavy-duty truck market.

Located near Cummins in Columbus, Indiana, the foundry was the last remaining independent U.S. diesel block and head casting supplier to the Class 8 truck market. Management believed that the 83-year-old foundry had embarked on a new era. The foundry's sole market sector had experienced newfound life during the 1990s.

It hoped a new management staff and new technologies would allow it to successfully respond to the challenge of new competition.

Golden Casting invested US$10 million on new coremaking technology and equipment to significantly boost productivity and better compete with rivals in Mexico and Brazil.

In 1997, the foundry became the first non-Big Three foundry in the U.S. to utilize an innovative interlocking core technology for producing engine blocks.

Golden Casting's fate as the last non-captive diesel engine block and head foundry began in the late 1970s and early 80s. Brazil’s foundries had come online offering low prices and open capacity when the U.S. economy sank. In 1980, North American Class 8 truck sales fell 36% from the previous year, and by 1982 sales were only 40% of their totals three years earlier.

A half-dozen other independent foundries closed. With Golden Casting’s business solely dependent on the diesel engine block and head market, the company had few options other than to trim its workforce by 75% and wait for the economy to recover.

Cost-cutting measures reduced scrap and improved productivity, and an automatic flow coater in the coreroom yielded a 32% productivity improvement. Employees also agreed to contract concessions to help weather the onslaught of foreign competition from the then-subsidized Brazilian foundries in a depressed U.S. economy.

After 16 years of ownership by Textron Corp., Golden Casting was sold to Stamford, Connecticut-based American Bailey in 1990, who became the sixth owner of the foundry. New to the foundry industry, American Bailey went on to purchase a former Caterpillar foundry in Fonderie de Vernon, France.

In 1990, while the Class 8 market was at its fourth lowest year since 1979 (and about to drop another 20% in 1991), American Bailey saw that Golden Casting held a strong position in a market in which capability was quickly disappearing. CEO Doug Bailey also believed that an entrepreneurial focus offered the opportunity to improve the plant's operations and better serve customers.

More effective management included pushing the decision making process downward. Capital was directed toward maintenance to improve machine uptime and process control, and coremaking equipment was rearranged to improve production flow.

"Because of the times, we had to be careful with our dollars, but we made a lot of small changes in a careful, prioritized manner," Bailey said. "We also worked to establish controlled processes and recipes, and the prepared sand control systems we put in place in 1992 and 1995 were big steps forward for us."

While Golden Casting's shipments only totaled 26,000 tons in its first year under American Bailey, the picture soon improved. The Class 8 market started showing promise and by 1994 and 1995 factory sales of 225,000 and 245,000 were posted - the market's finest years ever. In turn, Golden's shipments grew steadily, and in 1997, the company was producing nearly twice its 1991 output. In 1998, the foundry had roughly 30% market share for Class 8 blocks.

To upgrade Golden Casting's management team and technical expertise, the foundry handpicked top-level managers from Honda, Cummins, Fluor-Daniel, RCA Thompson, Nucor Steel and other foundries.

After working for Cummins more than 10 years as that company’s casting buyer, Mr. Bo Witt joined Golden Casting as vice president of sales and marketing. "I always viewed Golden as a fairly lean organization with real know-how. The foundry had technical expertise - especially with complex cylinder heads - that only comes through 15-20 years hands-on with the parts. It's always done a good job of combining good technical background with practical experience to bring tried and true expertise. When there was a casting no one else could make, there was never a question who I wanted to source it from."

"We've been feeling the pressure from producers in Brazil and Mexico," said Witt in 1998. "China, India and Eastern Europe Eastern Europe may also try to enter the market in the next three years, and they're hungry, have cheap labor and are willing to take on work at ridiculous prices."

While there's no way we can match the labor rates of some countries, that's only one part of the equation," Smith said. "A U.S. foundry has lower energy costs, better access to materials and logistical services, and the access to world class equipment and well-trained workers needed to maintain and operate such technology."

Golden Casting found a formidable weapon against its competitors' labor advantage ($1.86/hr in Mexico) in the form of an entirely different method of producing its blocks/heads.

Golden had built its reputation on its prowess in making intricate complex cores and boasted a mature, knowledgeable workforce that had been working on blocks and heads every day of their careers. But American Bailey management knew the foundry had to continue evolving forward so as to remain the most cutting edge coremaking block and head foundry around to be successful, especially with freer trade with Mexico on the horizon.

"Coremaking is the competency of this Class 8 business," said Bailey. "We needed the capability in coremaking that would provide dimensional tolerances and inherent strengths for the engines of tomorrow. They will require thinner sections and more significant design challenges that will place even more emphasis on the function and integrity of the core."

Virtually every coremaking option was explored, although only a couple of options offered the foundry anything more than material handling enhancements. Ultimately, Loramendi's "Key-Core" system provided the clearest advantage for blocks. Developed in 1987, the patented system allows the assembly and interlocking of individual cores to solid core packages without using glues or screws.

The company’s purchase marked the first North American application of the "Key-Core" system to large diesel blocks, and only the second worldwide. The company immediately realized the potential for a 15-20% cost reduction with the system.

In 1998, the foundry was enjoying the benefits of a strong Class 8 market. The market's 215,000-unit shipments in 1997 were second only to 1994 and 1995, and 1998 shipments were expected to make a run for a spot in the top three.

Golden was enjoying the ride of global growth from its customers, including shipping a 28-liter cylinder head to India. In 1997, the foundries largest customer Mack Trucks increased export sales by 54%, while Cummins reached its second highest sales totals ever.

The foundry was running 35 part numbers regularly and typically sees six redesigns per year, driven mainly by emissions and noise reduction initiatives. While yesterday's engines had a lifecycle of 20 years, increasing government demands for emissions and noise reduction had forced major redesigns every 3-5 years, opening the door for the foundry to utilize its new technology on a wider scale.

By 2000, Golden Casting had been awarded several new contracts from diesel engine and non-diesel customers.

After supplying two-cycle engine blocks and cylinder head castings to Detroit Diesel for many years, Golden Casting was awarded a large portion of the new Series 60 block casting business worth US$10 million annually.

Adding the Series 60 business to its Cummins and Mack orders, Golden Casting was producing engine blocks or cylinder head castings for four out of every ten Class 8 trucks produced in the United States.

In 2000, Golden Casting won contracts from Trane to produce compressor body castings, and from Mentor Automotive for brake drum and various other castings.

Despite investment and aggressive management, Golden Casting closed in April 2003 after union officials rejected a proposed 20% cut in wages and benefits. Two weeks later, the foundry reopened when the union agreed to the concessions.

Golden Casting planned to resume full operations while reorganizing its business operations under Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. However the foundry faced serious challenges including a loss of business and unpaid customer.

Golden Castings closed its doors for good in September 2003.

By 2004, Cummins had been striving to find cheaper suppliers of engine components. The company set up new buying offices in China (Shanghai), Czechoslovakia (Prague) and India (Pune) to locate new low-cost sources.

From 1999 thru 2004, Cummins claimed to have saved US$450 million.

But it also meant that Cummins had abandoned suppliers in the United States including Golden Casting. Until 1997, Cummins had been the foundry's largest customer (Mack became Golden’s largest customer after 1997).

Italy's Fiat promised Cummins a high-quality, low-cost alternative at their foundry in Mexico. Over a period of years, Cummins transferred more work to Mexico, leading to Golden Casting’s demise in 2003.

Fiat's Mexican foundry was selling parts for 30 percent less than Golden Casting's costs. Golden Casting struggled to catch up by automating its facility, and persuaded its union to accept a 10 percent cut in wages and 15 percent in health benefits. However, Golden Casting still couldn’t compete with Fiat’s Mexican foundry.

FYI: From late 2003, Brazilian foundry TUPY began supplying Volvo Powertrain with cylinder blocks.

Volvo Group announced on October 18, 2013 that its Hagerstown Volvo Powertrain facility would be assembling Mack-brand drive axles. I’ve mentioned before that Dana had produced Mack axles from 1984 thru 2003, after which time Volvo Group gave the work to Meritor.

Meritor was assembling Mack brand axles from components sourced from ANG Group of New Delhi, India. I assume ANG is now supplying Volvo Powertrain directly.

[blackdog2]

I remember back in the 60s there was a company in waterbury Conn that use to make Mack blocks rite a cross the street from the mack dealer owned buy Swirshski family.

[Bullheaded]

So Renault owned them but it was a MACK design.

Now Volvo owns them, Mack made their own changes to the Volvo engine, but it is Volvo (which is bad.) LOL, I'm confused.

Wow, lots of info in this thread. Amazing what you can search up on Wikipedia, lol.

[kscarbel]

So Renault owned them but it was a MACK design.

Now Volvo owns them, Mack made their own changes to the Volvo engine, but it is Volvo (which is bad.) LOL, I'm confused.

Wow, lots of info in this thread. Amazing what you can search up on Wikipedia, lol.

It is confusing the way you described it, because Mack never made any changes to Volvo engines.

• Volvo Group purchased Mack Trucks in 2000.
• Volvo Group began installing Volvo D-Series engines, produced at Volvo Powertrain, in Mack-branded Volvo VN and VHD chassis.
• The Mack-branded Volvo D-Series engines are programmed by Volvo Powertrain for Maxidyne, Maxi-Cruise and Econodyne characteristics.

Wikipedia??

[Mackpro]

In 2017 we will hopefully see the common rail MP engine here in the states. Being tested in Europe as we speak. Hopefully it will mean the end of the cup and broken injector issues.

[Swishy]

U jokers appear to gorn off topic

NEW MACK LOGO

so ifn U off topic

might az well offer up wot iz available on D udder sider of the world (Oz)

LOL

http://static.commercialmotor.com/big-lorry-blog/2010/07/08/Kingston%20HH%20big%20lift.jpg]http://static.commercialmotor.com/big-lorry-blog/2010/07/08/Kingston%20HH%20big%20lift.jpg

Clikity ........................ClikClikClik

cya

[rickykarenpr]

awesome the new logo i liked

[farmer52]

Since I saw the new MACK logo I like the previous one better....and I did not like it previously. Bring back the old logos and Bulldog pin!

[iaff5045]

i agree new logo SUCKS!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Briing back the old one.

[mackey58]

Can't bring back the old Volvo has killed off the old reliable bull dog